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This thesis develops and tests a theory about the impact of educational attainment on 
domestic terrorism. In particular, I formulate the following three propositions: (i) the 
directional effect of educational attainment on domestic terrorism depends on the base 
year; i.e., tertiary education will reduce terrorism, whereas primary/secondary educa-
tion can increase it; (ii) educational attainment yields increasingly diminishing marginal 
returns; (iii) the impact of educational attainment depends on the political and eco-
nomic conditions of the country. I derive hypotheses based on these propositions, and 
test them empirically by running a series of negative binomial regressions on a large 
panel of countries. 
 
Supporting the findings of Brockoff et al. (2015), my results indicate that tertiary at-
tainment exerts a pacifying effect on levels of domestic terrorism in countries where 
political and economic conditions are favorable. In addition, my paper also extends the 
findings of Brockoff et al. (2015) in a few key ways. First, I show that among wealthy 
democratic countries, the relationship between tertiary attainment and domestic terror-
ism is better modeled by a quadratic specification; that is, at higher levels of tertiary 
attainment, additional gains yield increasingly diminishing returns. Second, I demon-
strate that the pacifying effects of educational attainment do not require countries to 
have high economic development and robust democratic institutions. Instead, it appears 
as though the threshold for such pacifying effects is actually probably lower than the 
one implied by Brockoff et al. (2015).  
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ÖZET 
 
 
ERİŞİLEN EĞİTİM SEVİYESİNİN İÇ TERÖRİZM ÜZERİNE ŞARTLI ETKİLERİ 
 
 
JOHN LEE 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2016 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yar. Doç. Dr. Arzu Kıbrıs 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: erişilen eğitim seviyesi, iç terörizm, çatışma, şartlı etkiler, 
azalan etkileşim 
 
 
Bu tez erişilen eğitim seviyesinin iç terörizme etkisiyle ilgili bir teori geliştirmekte ve 
geliştirdiği teoriyi test etmektedir. Özellikle, şu üç öneriyi ileri sunuyorum: (i) erişilen 
eğitim seviyesinin iç terörizme direkt etkisi temel eğitim yılına bağlıdır; örneğin yüksek 
öğrenim terörizmi azaltırken ilkokul veya lise düzeyindeki eğitim terörizmi yükselte-
bilir; (ii) erişilen eğitim seviyesinin marjinal getirisi yükselen katsayılarla azalmaktadır; 
(iii) erişilen eğitim seviyesinin etkisi ülkenin politik ve ekonomik durumlarına bağlıdır. 
Hitopezlerimi bu öneriler üzerine oluşturdum ve ampirik olarak bir dizi negatif binom 
regresyonlarıyla geniş bir ülke grubu üzerinde test ettim. 
 
Sonuçlarım Brockoff et al. (2015)’in bulgularını desteklemekte, ekonomik ve siyasi 
şartların uygun olduğu ülkelerde yüksek öğretime katılımın iç terörizm üzerinde azaltıcı 
etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. Ek olarak, çalışmam Brockoff et al. (2015)’in bulgu-
larını bir iki çok önemli noktada geliştirmektedir. İlk olarak, varlıklı demokratik ülkel-
erde, yüksek öğretim ile iç terörizm arasındaki ilişki kuadratik spesifikasyon modeli ile 
daha iyi açıklanır; yani, ileri seviyelerdeki yüksek öğrenime katılımın getirileri gittikçe 
azalmaktadır. İkinci olarak, erişilen eğitim seviyesinin iç terörizmi azaltıcı etkisi ülkel-
erin yüksek ekonomik gelişimlerine ve sağlam demokratik kurumlarına bağlı değildir. 
Sonuçlarıma göre, terörü baskılayıcı etkileri olması beklenen bu faktörlerin eşiğinin 
Brockoff et al. (2015)’in belirttiğinden büyük ihtimalle daha az olduğu gözükmektedir.    
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION	  
 
 
 
 
Why study terrorism? In short, my answers are two-fold: first, it is identified by 
many as being one of the top concerns of our time; and second, its consequences are 
severe. In an age where the Internet and mass media have given us virtually instantane-
ous access to information around the world, a terrorist attack in one place can strike 
fear into the hearts of those living far away. For instance, since the attacks it sustained 
on September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been relatively insulated from the recent rise in 
global terrorist activity. Yet despite this reality, in a recent WSJ/NBC poll, 40% of re-
spondents selected national security and terrorism as the federal government’s greatest 
priorities (Engel 2015). After the recent attacks in France, Belgium, and Turkey, far-
right parties in Europe are expanding as voters afraid of terrorism begin resisting the 
entry of new immigrants (Solomon et al. 2016).  
 
The costs of terrorism have also grown in size. In the year 2014, acts of terror 
around the world cost about $52.9 billion, according to a report from the Institute for 
Economics and Peace (Yoon and Tartar 2015). This is about the size of Bulgaria’s en-
tire annual GDP, as the authors of the article point out. In addition, terrorist attacks 
claimed the lives of more than 32,000 people that year (ibid.). What is terrorism? What 
conditions coalesce to produce a fertile ground for terrorist group recruitment? Con-
versely, what factors discourage or even reduce terrorist activity? Many policymakers 
and media outlets have argued for years that educational attainment can reduce terror-
ism; is there any empirical merit to this claim? My thesis attempts to propose and test 
one possible answer to this last question.  
 
My research question is the following: at the cross-national level, what is the 
nature of the relationship between educational attainment and domestic terrorism? Does 
more education really make a difference—and if so, under what conditions? This thesis 
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develops and tests a theory about the impact of countrywide educational attainment on 
incidents of domestic terrorism. In short, I argue that the effects of educational attain-
ment on domestic terrorism are both nonlinear and conditional in nature. First, I do not 
expect an increase in primary and secondary attainment of X% to have the same impact 
on domestic terrorism as an equivalent increase of X% in tertiary attainment. In fact, a 
rise in basic and intermediate levels of education may actually fuel more terrorism 
whereas gains in tertiary education may reduce it (Hypothesis #1). Second, I argue that 
the effects of educational attainment are also nonlinear in the sense that higher levels of 
attainment yield increasingly diminishing returns (Hypothesis #2); for example, a gain 
in the tertiary attainment rate from 20% to 30% probably has a greater marginal impact 
than an increase of the same magnitude from 90% to 100%.   
 
Finally, I also argue that the impact of educational attainment on domestic ter-
rorism is dependent on the political and economic conditions of the country (Hypothe-
sis #3). In countries with high economic development and/or democratic institutions, 
gains in educational attainment are expected to have pacifying effects; in countries that 
are neither wealthy nor democratic, educational attainment is not expected to reduce 
levels of such violence. In fact, under such poor structural conditions, rising levels of 
educational attainment might even exacerbate a country’s problems with domestic ter-
rorism. Ultimately, I test my hypotheses by running a series of negative binomial re-
gressions on a cross-national panel dataset.  
 
Given the widespread optimism regarding the supposedly pacifying effects of 
educational attainment on terrorism, the relative scarcity of macro-level research study-
ing this link is surprising. Most cross-national studies have focused on alternative driv-
ers of terrorism: economic conditions (Abadie 2006; Freytag et al. 2011), regime type 
(Li 2005), political stability (Kis-Katos et al. 2011), government repression (Kurrild-
Klitgaard et al. 2006), and identity-based tensions (Piazza 2006). Many of the forego-
ing studies do not even include measures of educational attainment (e.g., literacy rates) 
as statistical controls in their research design. Even fewer still, such as a recent paper 
by Brockoff et al. (2015), clearly articulate and test hypotheses that specifically tie edu-
cational attainment to incidents of terrorism.  
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Why has the formulation and empirical testing of education-related theories re-
mained less prominent in this cross-national literature? One possibility is that the per-
ceived scholarly value of the enterprise has been undermined by micro-level studies 
which frequently indicate that individual terrorists are neither poor nor uneducated. For 
example, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) show that the deceased Hezbollah militants in 
their sample are actually more likely to have attended secondary school than members 
of the referent Lebanese population; similarly, Berrebi (2007) reports that Palestinian 
suicide bombers are much less likely to come from families living in poverty. 
 
However, the fact that Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) se-
lected their sample on the dependent variable limits their ability to generalize their find-
ings (e.g., see Geddes 1990). Moreover, even if terrorists are not necessarily poor and 
uneducated at the individual level, it does not imply that a country’s socioeconomic 
conditions are totally unrelated to its problems with terrorism. For instance, at the coun-
try level, researchers have shown that economic downturns—and not periods of 
growth—are associated with increases in terrorist activity (Blomberg et al. 2004; Ho-
naker 2004). At first glance, it might seem challenging to reconcile these two appar-
ently contradictory empirical accounts: after all, how can the directional effects of eco-
nomic factors on terrorism differ depending on the level of analysis? This is an impor-
tant question vis-à-vis this present paper, because the directional effects of educational 
attainment might also differ based on the level of analysis examined: i.e., individual (or 
micro) level and country (or macro) level. For example, although many individual ter-
rorists appear to be better educated (Krueger and Maleckova 2003), countrywide gains 
in educational attainment might still reduce aggregate levels of such violence.  	  
 
Bueno de Mesquita (2005) provides an explication of this puzzle via a formal 
model of a terrorist group’s recruitment process. Since terrorist organizations are highly 
motivated and want to achieve their objectives, they prefer to accept only the best from 
their pool of willing and interested candidates. Due to this screening effect, one cannot 
necessarily draw conclusions about the quality of the overall pool of candidates based 
on the backgrounds of those who are actually chosen. In fact, although actual terrorists 
may be of a higher socioeconomic status than members of the general population, Mes-
quita’s model predicts that most of the people in the candidate pool are actually quite 
   
  	  
 4 
poor and less educated. Thus, the implication of this prediction is quite insightful: as 
socioeconomic conditions improve, highly qualified individuals will have steeper op-
portunity costs for involvement in terrorism; this shrinks the pool of interested candi-
dates and raises the recruitment costs of terror groups—resulting in a fewer number of 
terrorist attacks, ceteris paribus.  
 
To recapitulate, although it might be tempting to merely extrapolate findings 
about the link between education and terrorism from individual-level studies, a more 
comprehensive study of this relationship at the cross-national level is still warranted. 
There are many theoretical reasons why educational attainment should reduce incidents 
of terrorism at the country level. For instance, a highly educated population enjoys bet-
ter economic opportunities and thus faces greater opportunity costs for complicity in 
illegal activities; in addition, it is better equipped to articulate political frustrations in 
nonviolent (and less costly) ways, and resist the propaganda attempts of extremist 
groups. 
 
This thesis proceeds as follows: in Chapter 2, I briefly survey previous studies 
that either controlled for the effects of education on terrorism or focused on education 
as the key explanatory variable. In Chapter 3, I develop my theory regarding the nonli-
near conditional effects of educational attainment on domestic terrorism and derive se-
veral testable hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I describe my research design; and in Chapter 
5, I present my empirical results and analysis. In the last sections, I review the robust-
ness of my results, summarize key findings, and discuss policy implications. 	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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
 
 
2.1 What is Terrorism? 
 
 
What is terrorism? While the answer might initially seem obvious, the reality is 
that terrorism is a contested term. Scholars and practitioners across a range of fields 
including political science, sociology, law, psychology, philosophy, and even public 
health have developed different understandings of this term. To manage the scope of 
this review, I will discuss several key conceptions of terrorism used in the related fields 
of law, political science, and sociology; subsequently, I will formulate and justify the 
conception of terrorism that is used within this thesis.  
 
2.1(i) Law 
 
It is probably helpful to begin this discussion with examples of how terrorism is 
defined by national laws and international organizations; because of their practical 
function, these definitions are by nature more formulaic, precise, and non-theoretical. 
For instance, according to the U.S. Federal Penal Code (18 U.S.C. § 2331), an act of 
“Domestic terrorism” must satisfy the following three conditions (FBI 2016):  
 
1. “Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;” 
2. “Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) 
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination. 
or kidnapping; and” 
3. “Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.” 
 
Turkey has a definition of terrorism enshrined in its Anti-Terror Law (No. 
3713). The definition, which is quite detailed, seems to place a greater emphasis on the 
state as being a key victim or target of the act. For instance, terrorism is described as an 
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act that seeks to undermine “the authority of the State” or change “the characteristics of 
the Republic as specified in the Constitution” (MASAK 2016). The full definition is 
described below: 
 
“Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an or-
ganization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as speci-
fied in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, 
damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endan-
gering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying 
or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and free-
doms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order 
or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, 
oppression or threat.” 
 
Largely due to its diverse membership and size, the United Nations General As-
sembly has yet to formally adopt a binding definition of terrorism. However, various 
UN organs have at times issued their own interpretations of the term. In 2004, the UN 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1566, which employed the following 
definition of terrorism (UNSC 2004):  
 
“…criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to pro-
voke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international or-
ganization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which con-
stitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conven-
tions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable 
by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, relig-
ious or other similar nature…” 
 
Another major international entity, the European Union, adopted a legal frame-
work for “combating terrorism” in 2002. According to the EU Council, terrorism is an 
action that harms individuals and/or property and is motivated by at least one of the fol-
lowing three aims (EU 2002):1  
 
1. “seriously intimidating a population, or” 
                                                
 
1 The actual text of the EU Council decision includes a specific list of attacks against people (e.g., murder, kidnap-
ping, hostage taking) and property (e.g., damaging government factilities) that would, in combination with one of the 
three motivations, constitute an act of terrorism.  
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2. “unduly compelling a Government or international organization to per-
form or abstain from performing any act, or”  
3. “seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitu-
tional, economic or social structures of a country or an international or-
ganization,”  
 
While differences of course exist among the foregoing definitions, generally 
speaking, a few key similarities emerge. That is, definitions of terrorism codified in 
laws and promulgated by international organizations seem to indicate that the term has 
three key components: first, the acts are aimed at individuals, the state, and/or property; 
second, the act is aimed at inciting fear and intimidation; third, the act is perpetrated in 
order to achieve some broader purpose that transcends the specific circumstances of the 
act itself. For example, perhaps the perpetrator of the act is seeking to influence gov-
ernment policy or effect some sort of social or cultural change.    
 
While a comprehensive survey of legal scholars is impossible, it is worth in-
cluding a definition formulated by Cherif Bassiouni, a highly cited law professor and 
author of a textbook on international criminal law. His definition excludes the targeting 
of civilians, and interestingly, also acknowledges the possibility of state-sponsored ter-
rorism (Bassiouni 2001).  
 
“Terrorism is an ideologically-motivated strategy of internationally proscribed 
violence designed to inspire terror within a particular segment of a given society 
in order to achieve a power-outcome or to propagandize a claim or grievance, 
irrespective of whether its perpetrators are acting for and on behalf of them-
selves, or on behalf of a state.” 
 
 
2.1(ii) Political Science and Conflict Studies  
 
Quantitative political scientists working with cross-national datasets tend to ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly adopt the definitions used by the major datasets. For in-
stance, the ITERATE data set, a well-known dataset on transnational terrorist events, 
defines terrorism as the following: “…the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-
normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear 
directed at a large audience” (Burgoon 2006). The phrase “political objectives” encom-
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passes “the promotion of religious freedoms, economic equality, income redistribution, 
nationalism, separatism, ideological ends, nihilism, and issue-specific goals” (ibid.).  
 
Similar to the definitions contained in national laws and formulated by legal 
scholars, the ITERATE definition also emphasizes the harmful act itself and the 
broader purpose that motivates it (i.e., some “political objective”). However, in one 
sense, the ITERATE definition is more expansive, because it also includes the mere 
threat of violence—in addition to the actual perpetration of some violent act. A partial 
list of the scholars using this dataset—and thus offering at least a tacit endorsement of 
its definition—include the following: Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010), Blomberg 
et al. (2004), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Lai (2007), Li (2005), Li and Schaub 
(2004), and Piazza (2008b).  
 
While formulaic conceptions of terrorism are certainly useful, other political 
scientists have contributed to the literature by highlighting the importance of framing. 
Some scholars, for example, acknowledge that the phenomenon under study can also be 
called “political violence” (e.g., Crenshaw 1983). One advantage of framing terrorism 
as political violence is that the latter term is more neutral and carries fewer normative 
implications. While likely unintended, the use of the term “terrorism” itself confers an 
implicit form of judgment—that identifies one party as being “morally wrong” (i.e., the 
perpetrator) whereas the other is “morally right” (i.e., the victim). But perhaps both 
sides might be “morally wrong”; that is, perhaps in different ways, both sides are “vic-
tims” of each other. While civilian casualties are certainly undesirable for most, the re-
ality is that what constitutes an act of terrorism for one party might be viewed as a justi-
fied act for another (e.g., it might be perceived by a group as being necessary in its fight 
for freedom).   
 
 
2.1(iii) Sociology  
 
Sociologists have also made a valuable contribution to the literature by suggest-
ing that terrorism can be conceptualized as one type of social movement. Beck (2008) 
argues that Social Movement Theory (SMT) can be used as a theoretical framework to 
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improve our understanding of terrorism. SMT is organized around three core ideas: the 
mobilization of resources, the necessity of political opportunities, and the importance of 
framing (e.g., McAdam et al. 1996). The parallels here are noteworthy. First, as with 
other (albeit less violent) social movements, terrorism requires a large amount of dif-
ferent resources. In the following excerpt from his article, Beck (2008) described some 
of these key needs and organizational similarities:  
 
“…terrorist groups face organizational and resource dilemmas similar to social 
movements, if not even more acute. In fact, many terrorist groups seem to be 
structured like modern social movement organizations—a highly professional-
ized core that directs and manages attacks, assembles resources, and provides 
overall leadership to a broader base of supporters.”   
 
Second, SMT argues that social movements do not emerge in a vacuum. A se-
ries of social, economic, and/or political conditions must coalesce to produce a context 
that is ripe for the emergence of a given movement (McAdam 1982). In a similar sense, 
a combination of contextual factors can create a climate that is more conducive for ter-
rorist recruitment and operations. For instance, ceteris paribus, terrorist groups are gen-
erally better able to recruit members in countries with high unemployment (Honaker 
2004), domestic instability (Campos and Gassebner 2009), and severe demographic 
pressures (Tavares 2004, Burgoon 2006). The emphasis of the SMT on the effect of 
political opportunities might also help explain how terrorist groups tend to adapt their 
tactics based on their present context: e.g., when the country’s security forces are 
strong, terrorists might focus more on soft targets (Beck 2008).   
 
Third, SMT also claims that social movements need to package their narratives 
in a way that will elicit the sympathies of the broader population—a concept called 
“frame alignment” (Benford and Snow 2000). By carefully framing their messages and 
managing their public perception, these movements seek to expand their recruitment 
pools and amass resources. For quite some time, scholars have argued that the media 
plays a key role in this process (e.g., Gitlin 1980). Similarly, terrorist groups expend a 
great deal of effort in crafting and projecting its message to its target audiences: poten-
tial recruits, the mass public, and the state apparatus itself. To support their narratives, 
these groups also often choose symbolic targets, including government buildings and 
specific individuals.  
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2.2 Empirical Findings 
 
 
As discussed in the previous section, different scholars across a range of fields 
have for good reasons chosen to define terrorism in different ways. Although I prefer 
the more neutral phrase “political violence”—which carries fewer normative implica-
tions—I have decided to continue using the word “terrorism” because much of the rele-
vant empirical literature does so as well. In particular, I adopt the definition of terrorism 
used by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which offers the practical benefit of 
enabling me to use the dataset. I prefer the GTD dataset over the ITERATE dataset 
mentioned earlier, because ITERATE only includes transnational incidences of terror-
ism; moreover, the GTD is also commonly employed in large-N studies on the subject 
(e.g., Kis-Katos et al. 2011). According to the GTD, a terrorist attack is an event that 
involves “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor 
to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or in-
timidation” (START 2015). 	  
 
To date, there are about a dozen cross-national studies that have examined the 
effects of educational attainment on terrorism either directly (i.e., as the key explana-
tory variable) or indirectly (i.e., as a control). Taken as a whole, the results appear to be 
largely inconsistent and contradictory. For instance, Azam and Thelen (2008, 2010) 
find that educational attainment has a statistically significant negative or pacifying ef-
fect on terrorism. In contrast, Tavares (2004) reports that increasing levels of education 
might actually be linked to more terrorism (see also, e.g., Testas 2004; Urdal 2006). 
Finally, a third group of scholars do not find any statistically robust links between 
country-wide levels of education and incidents of terrorism (e.g., Drakos and Gofas 
2006a; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006).  
 
Upon a closer examination, it appears as though these discrepancies are largely 
due to a fusion of several factors rooted in research design. First, the foregoing studies 
use three different types of terrorism counts as their dependent variable: the number of 
domestic terrorism incidents (e.g., Brockoff et al. 2015), the number of transnational 
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terrorism incidents produced (e.g., Azam and Thelen 2008), and the number of transna-
tional terrorism incidents experienced (e.g., Drakos and Gofas 2006a). Even if the same 
measure of educational attainment had been used in all of these studies, it is easy to see 
that the usage of a different type of terrorism count could produce incongruent out-
comes. The theorized causal effects of educational attainment are heavily contingent 
upon the specific nature of the terrorist event. 
 
For example, in a given country, high educational attainment may decrease the 
number of domestic terrorism incidents by improving economic opportunity and allevi-
ating inequality. Perhaps for a similar reason, the number of transnational attacks origi-
nating from the same country might also decrease. However, it is difficult to see why a 
rise in the education levels of the target country would make it less vulnerable to trans-
national attacks emanating from a different country. As such, it is probably not a coin-
cidence that studies reporting statistically positive links between education and terror-
ism often selected as their dependent variable the number of transnational terrorism in-
cidents experienced (e.g., Testas 2004).  
 
Second, these empirical discrepancies could also be due to how educational at-
tainment was operationalized. After all, even if all of the studies had chosen the same 
type of terrorism count—e.g., domestic incidents of terrorism—it is possible for educa-
tion proxy A to exert a different effect than education proxies B or C. Again, the diver-
sity here is worth noting. For example, Azam and Thelen (2008, 2010) used gross sec-
ondary attainment rates; Testas (2004) used tertiary or university attainment rates; Ur-
dal (2006) used tertiary education growth; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) used the 
UNDP education index; and Tavares (2004) used adult male illiteracy rates.  
 
In sum, the existing body of literature concerning the link between educational 
and domestic terrorism remains inconclusive; as such, there are still very real opportu-
nities to improve our knowledge of this research area.  In this thesis I argue that the 
country-level effects of educational attainment on domestic terrorism are shaped by key 
contextual factors: i.e., a country’s political and economic conditions. Only Blomberg 
and Hess (2008), Brockoff et al. (2015), and Urdal (2006) explicitly consider the possi-
bility that the link between educational attainment and terrorism is itself shaped by an 
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intervening variable. Many of the other studies at least implicitly assume that educa-
tional attainment shares a simple linear relationship with incidents of terrorism. How-
ever, this assumption is problematic for theoretical reasons.	  
 
 For instance, one might expect a high rate of tertiary attainment to reduce ter-
rorism by increasing the economic opportunity costs of involvement in illegal activities. 
However, this prediction implicitly depends on whether higher educational attainment 
will actually generate improved economic outcomes at the macro level—which might 
not necessarily be the case for a variety of reasons (e.g., an economic downturn, 
chronic corruption). Similarly, a more educated population will probably be better 
equipped to participate in the political process, which may decrease support for terror-
ism by opening alternative means of voicing dissent. However, this chain of logic pre-
supposes that such participation is legal and meaningful in the first place.   
 
Since Brockoff et al. (2015) specifically develop and test hypotheses about the 
conditional effects of educational attainment on domestic terrorism, it warrants a brief 
discussion here. After my review of this study, I explain how I plan to build on their 
work and further refine our knowledge of the relationship between educational attain-
ment and domestic terrorism. The key innovation of Brockoff et al. (2015) was their 
usage of a two-step cluster analysis, which allowed the authors to test whether the ef-
fects of educational attainment are shaped by a country’s political, socioeconomic, and 
demographic conditions. First, they divided their sample of 133 countries (1984-2007) 
into two groups based on a range of country-specific characteristics (e.g., economic 
growth, inflation level, rule of law, corruption); then, they ran separate regressions on 
each cluster.  
 
According to their results, additional years of schooling do indeed have diver-
gent effects on incidents of domestic terrorism based on the quality of each cluster: in 
countries where structural conditions are favorable (e.g., better economic development 
and the rule of law), increases in tertiary attainment reduce levels of domestic terror-
ism; on the other hand, in countries where structural conditions are less ideal (e.g., low 
respect for property rights), rising levels of primary attainment actually seem to exacer-
bate domestic terrorism.   
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While Brockoff et al. (2015) offer some empirical evidence that the impact of 
educational attainment on domestic terrorism is itself determined by country-specific 
factors, a key limitation of their research design is its inability to explain specifically 
why. Brockoff and her coauthors used twelve variables in their cluster analysis to as-
sign each country to one of the two groups.2 Do all twelve play an equal role in shaping 
the effects of educational attainment on incidents of domestic terrorism? Alternatively, 
is it mostly law and order? Or, is it a combination of urbanization, property rights, and 
economic growth? Which factors play the deciding role in determining whether addi-
tional years of schooling will promote or reduce domestic terrorism? 	  
 
My thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by developing and testing hy-
potheses that predict how specific factors determine the nature of the link between edu-
cational attainment and domestic terrorism: e.g., is a high level of economic develop-
ment by itself sufficient to produce conditions in which educational attainment will ex-
ert a pacifying effect on domestic terrorism? Moreover, I also attempt to build upon 
existing studies by empirically testing whether educational attainment yields diminish-
ing marginal returns (i.e., via the use of a quadratic specification); to the best of my 
knowledge, this has yet to be tested in the large-N cross-national terrorism literature.  
 
The scope of my investigation is limited to domestic incidents of terror—i.e., at-
tacks perpetrated by actors inside their country of origin—for two reasons. First, educa-
tional attainment is theorized to be more robustly tied to the production of domestic 
perpetrators and incidents; in contrast, research shows that transnational terrorist at-
tacks are often likely to be driven by concerns tied to foreign policy, ideology, or eco-
nomic integration (e.g., Piazza 2008a). Second, domestic incidents of terrorism account 
for the vast majority of terrorist incidents around the world; in fact, they outnumber 
transnational attacks by a scale of 4:1 (Enders et al. 2011). 
 
 
                                                
 
2 The full list of variables used by Brockoff et al. (2015) to assign countries to either one of the two clusters included: 
law and order, corruption, government size, physical integrity, population density, population growth, urbanization, 
GDP per capita, economic growth, property rights protection, inflation, and female labor participation.  	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CHAPTER 3:  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
 
 
 
 
In this section, I briefly review Lee’s (2011) theory of violent and nonviolent 
participation in politics. By extending Lee’s model, I derive propositions and testable 
hypotheses about the expected empirical link between educational attainment and do-
mestic terrorism at the country level. According to Lee, the individual-level decision to 
engage in terrorism is modeled by a two-step process. First, individuals must decide to 
participate in the political process at all; second, they must decide whether they will do 
so peacefully or via the use of violent and illegal means. Significantly, distinct cost 
structures are expected to be more salient at different stages of the decision-making 
process.  
 
Individuals deciding whether to participate as political activists must first over-
come initial “entry costs” such as possessing a certain minimum standard of informa-
tion and resources. Those who are unable to meet this threshold are unlikely to partici-
pate simply because they lack sufficient information (e.g., due to illiteracy or weak so-
cial networks); alternatively, they may also lack disposable income and time due to 
their low socioeconomic status. People who do overcome these initial barriers and 
choose to get involved must then decide whether the expected benefits of violent activ-
ism outweigh its high costs (i.e., relative to peaceful activism, which is less risky).  
 
Using colonial era data from the Indian province of Bengal, Lee offers some 
empirical support for his model. He shows that while Bengali terrorists were from 
higher socioeconomic backgrounds than members of the general population, they were 
less educated and less wealthy compared to non-violent political activists. One plausi-
ble implication of this finding is that the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
involvement in terrorism can be modeled by an inverted U-shaped curve. Until socio-
economic status hits an upper threshold, marginal gains may actually increase the like-
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lihood of involvement in terrorism (i.e., as well as all forms of political activism); how-
ever, after socioeconomic status hits this upper threshold, subsequent increases in edu-
cation or income may deter many political activists from engaging in violence—
because the opportunity costs of doing so become intolerably expensive. 	  	  
Based on the foregoing discussion, I formulate a theory about the impact of 
educational attainment on domestic terrorism at the cross-national level of analysis. In 
short, country-wide gains in education shape aggregate trends in all manifestations of 
political participation. By creating macro-level conditions that are more conducive to 
either peaceful or violent forms of such activism, educational attainment may materi-
ally affect the prevalence of domestic terrorism in a country. In the coming sections I 
explain why educational attainment might specifically exert both a nonlinear and condi-
tional effect on incidents of domestic terrorism.  
 
 
 
3.1 Proposition #1: Nonlinear Relationship 
 
 
As indicated in the introduction of this paper, I argue that country levels of edu-
cational attainment should share a nonlinear relationship with incidents of domestic ter-
rorism. I mean this in two different senses. First, I do not expect an X% national in-
crease in primary and secondary attainment to have the same impact on domestic ter-
rorism as an equivalent increase of X% in tertiary attainment. In fact, a rise in basic and 
intermediate levels of education may actually fuel more terrorism whereas gains in ter-
tiary education may reduce it. While this might initially seem counterintuitive, there are 
compelling reasons to believe that the effect of each additional year of schooling de-
pends upon the base year.   
 
The political behavior literature broadly attests to the strength of the link be-
tween education and various forms of political knowledge, interest, and participation 
(e.g., Dee 2004; Grönlund and Milner 2006; Milligan et al. 2004). For example, using 
randomized experiments—the gold standard of research design—Sondheimer and 
Green (2010) show convincingly that high school graduation rates can boost voter turn-
out. Other studies based on natural experiments have suggested that education may in-
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directly promote political participation (Berinsky and Lenz 2011). In sum, generally 
speaking, citizens who are better educated are more likely to be meaningfully engaged 
in the political process. Even if the public masses do not formally lack access to politi-
cal information (e.g., due to a state policy of censorship), processing it often requires a 
certain sophistication that is associated with literacy and higher levels of education. 
 
However, as Berrebi (2007) observes, better educated people are also more like-
ly to be cognizant of social, cultural, or economic injustices. Educational attainment 
can also lead people to develop “a sense of social responsibility and civic engagement” 
(ibid.). Thus, an increased awareness of societal grievances in combination with a 
heightened desire to respond may lead citizens to get involved in more radical forms of 
political activism. As such, when countries experience a rise in basic and intermediate 
levels of education (i.e., primary and secondary), I expect them to experience a surge in 
all manifestations of political activism, including incidents of domestic terrorism. As 
Lee (2011) argues, engagement in acts of domestic terrorism is also one type of politi-
cal participation or activism, albeit a violent and illegal one. 	  
 
On the other hand, an increase of the same magnitude in the country-wide at-
tainment of higher education is expected to be associated with a net reduction in do-
mestic terrorism. As educational attainment rises beyond the secondary level, citizens 
on average have access to increasingly better jobs and opportunities for upward socio-
economic mobility. Under such conditions, the average pool of terrorists may contract, 
as more potential recruits face prohibitively steep opportunity costs for engaging in 
such violence (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). Since most governments vigilantly prosecute 
and severely punish terrorists, those with progressively rising social statuses have much 
to lose by participating in illegal activity. This aggregate decline in both the number 
and quality of interested candidates raises the recruitment costs of terror groups, which 
can reduce the number of terrorist attacks at the country level.  
 
Given the initial entry barriers inherent in the individual-level decision to par-
ticipate in political activism, Proposition 1 states that educational attainment shares a 
nonlinear relationship with domestic terrorism at the country level. Specifically, I ex-
pect the relationship to resemble an inverted U-shaped curve. The idea that two varia-
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bles might share such a U-shaped relationship is not my original invention, of course. 
Such a relationship has been empirically observed in a diverse range of fields including 
economics (Kuznets 1955), public health (Blanchflower and Oswald 2008), occupatio-
nal psychology (Clark et al. 1996), and even environmental science (Andreoni and Le-
vinson 2001). The central idea behind my first proposition is illustrated in Figure 1:  
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Expected U-Shaped Relationship Between Educational Attainment and Domestic 
Terrorism (not to-scale)3	  
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Proposition #1, I derive my first testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Whereas gains in the attainment of basic and intermediate educa-
tion will increase incidents of domestic terrorism, gains in the attainment of 
higher education will reduce incidents of domestic terrorism.  
 
 
 
                                                
 
3 This graph was generated using the free online graphing tool at www.emathhelp.net/	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3.2 Proposition #2: Diminishing Marginal Returns	  
 
 
Second, I suggest that the effects of educational attainment are also nonlinear in 
the sense that it yields increasingly diminishing returns at higher levels. For example, a 
gain in the tertiary attainment rate from 20% to 30% probably has a greater marginal 
impact than an increase of the same magnitude from 90% to 100%. There are theoreti-
cal reasons for this. When a country’s educational attainment rates are relatively low, 
subsequent gains will boost a nation’s stock of human capital, promoting economic 
growth and job creation. However, when attainment rates are already high, further 
gains might generate increasingly diminishing macroeconomic benefits. That is, in 
countries where the vast majority of adults graduate from high school, high school di-
plomas are worth less on the job market; similarly, college degrees are also less valu-
able in the job markets of countries with very high levels of post-secondary educational 
attainment (e.g., college degree).  
 
Sociologists of education have written about this phenomenon for some time. In 
fact, there is even a term for it: “credential inflation” (e.g., Brown 2001; Collins 2002). 
As Van de Werfhorst and Andersen (2005) observe, the broad expansion of educational 
attainment within a society tends to increase the entry-level qualifications in the labor 
market; e.g., certain jobs that had only required high school diplomas in the past now 
require applicants to hold a bachelor’s degree. Economists have studied the implica-
tions of these trends at the macro-level. For example, in a cross-national study, Krueger 
and Lindahl (2001) find that the effect of educational attainment on economic growth is 
better modeled by a nonlinear quadratic specification (e.g., also see Trostel 2005). 	  
 
Accordingly, Proposition 2 states that educational attainment yields increasingly 
diminishing returns at higher levels. From Proposition 2, I derive my second testable 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of basic/intermediate and higher education on domes-
tic terrorism can be modeled by a quadratic specification. 	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3.3 Proposition #3: Conditional Effects 
 
 
At the micro level, once individuals overcome the initial entry barriers to politi-
cal activism, they must now decide whether they want to get involved—and if so, 
whether to participate peacefully or by using violence (Lee 2011). At this stage, the op-
portunity costs of engaging in illegal acts such as terrorism become much more salient. 
However, as I argue in the third part of my theory, the salience of such costs at the 
country level is itself highly dependent upon a series of mediating factors. For opportu-
nity costs to have a moderating or pacifying effect on terrorist recruitment, they must 
be perceived by potential terrorists as actually being substantive in nature.   
 
Presumably, there are a number of cases in which macro conditions (e.g., an 
economic recession) militate against the normally positive link between rises in univer-
sity attainment and the associated benefits thereof (e.g., better jobs). Under such cir-
cumstances, there are fewer reasons to expect a growth in the attainment of higher edu-
cation to be accompanied by an aggregate decline in domestic terrorism. Specifically, I 
argue that the pacifying effects of gains in higher education on incidents of domestic 
terrorism are heavily tied to country-level political and economic factors; this is re-
stated below as Proposition 3: The effects of gains in the attainment of higher education 
on domestic terrorism are dependent upon country-level political and economic factors.  
 
 
 
3.4 Political Conditions 
 
 
A rise in country-wide tertiary attainment should reduce domestic terrorism be-
cause greater numbers of citizens will be equipped to utilize alternative (and less 
costly) means of voicing grievances. On average, highly educated citizens are better 
able to engage meaningfully and productively in the political process. For example, in a 
cross-national study, Grönlund and Milner (2006) demonstrate that education is a key 
determinant of political knowledge; and Brady et al. (1995) show that key indices of 
socioeconomic status (e.g., civic skill)—which are correlates of university education—
affect the likelihood of participation in non-voting political activities such as volunteer-
ing. 
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However, the pacifying effects of tertiary education are contingent upon 
whether such opportunities for peaceful engagement actually materialize. In countries 
where governments are repressive and systematically exclude the public masses from 
participating, large gains in university attainment may actually foster political vio-
lence—as frustrated and increasingly knowledgeable citizens rebel against the state. 
There is at least some empirical evidence for this claim. Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) 
find that democracy is negatively associated with terrorism; similarly, Krueger and 
Maleckova (2003) report that the protection of civil liberties tends to reduce the pro-
duction of transnational terrorism. Based on this discussion, I derive the hypothesis be-
low.    
 
Hypothesis 3a: Gains in the attainment of higher education will reduce domestic 
terrorism among democratic states; among authoritarian states, these gains will 
either promote domestic terrorism or have no substantial effect in either direc-
tion. 
 
 
 
3.5 Economic Conditions 
 
 
When economic conditions are highly unfavorable, marginal gains in higher 
levels of education (e.g., university) may actually promote domestic terrorism. The 
relative deprivation theory, for instance, suggests that people are more likely to develop 
grievances if they perceive a gap between what they actually have and what they think 
they are entitled to (Gurr 1970; Walker and Pettigrew 1984). These grievances may 
lead to deviant behavior including acts of violence (Kawachia et al. 1999). Increased 
educational attainment may worsen relative deprivation at the country level if it sys-
tematically heightens aspirations while leaving them unfulfilled. This may occur when 
increases in educational attainment are not accompanied by widespread improvements 
in living standards or reduced inequalities. For example, Kavanagh (2011) finds that 
poverty is a positive predictor of participation in Hezbollah only among those with a 
relatively high educational background. 	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Progressive gains in educational attainment are unlikely to be followed by a 
commensurate expansion of economic opportunity when countries are underdeveloped 
and poor. As such, I derive the following testable hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Gains in the attainment of higher education will reduce domestic 
terrorism among wealthy states; among poor states, these gains will either pro-
mote domestic terrorism or have no substantial effect in either direction. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 	  	  	  
4.1 Data Collection 
 
 
In order to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, I assembled a 
dataset of 149 countries for the years 1983-2013.4 My dependent variable is the number 
of domestic incidents of terrorism that occurred in a given country and year. For my 
terrorism data, I will draw on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is a pub-
licly available dataset managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
at the University of Maryland. The GTD is a comprehensive database, containing in-
formation on over 140,000 incidents between 1970 and 2014; it is also employed in 
many empirical studies on the subject (e.g., Brockoff et al. 2015; Kis-Katos et al. 
2011).	  
 	  
The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the intentional use of “violence or imme-
diate threat of violence” by a non-state actor that also meets at least two of the follow-
ing three conditions (START 2015):  
 (1) “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or so-
cial goal.” 	  
(2) “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey 
some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate 
victims.”  
(3) ︎“The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.”  
 
                                                
 
4 Country data for my dependent variable (DV) are from the years 1983-2013; however, because I am lagging my 
independent variables by one year, the country data for my independent variables are from 1982-2012 (see pg. 33 for 
an explanation on why I lag my IV’s).	  
   
  	  
 23 
Unfortunately, the GTD does not include a variable that indicates whether a ter-
rorist event is domestic or transnational. Enders et al. (2011) identify a five-step proce-
dure that can be used to disaggregate the data; however, a quick glance at their replica-
tion datasets reveals that their method systematically underestimates the true number of 
domestic events. For example, incidents that took place in the UK but had victims from 
Great Britain were often coded as being transnational in nature. Given this issue, I use a 
slightly modified version of their method in order to identify the domestic events for 
inclusion in my analysis.5 	  
 
 For my key explanatory variables, I use two measures of educational attain-
ment: the sum of primary and secondary enrollment (%), and tertiary enrollment (%). 
All percentages are gross rates and are drawn from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) dataset compiled by the World Bank. I am aware that enrollment and attain-
ment, while conceptually similar, are not necessarily the same: e.g., academic achieve-
ment can be lower in areas deeply affected by civil conflict (Kibris 2015). As such, ac-
tual completion (or graduation) rates are better indicators of educational attainment 
than enrollment alone. Unfortunately, the World Bank only has completion data for 
primary school.  
 
Limited by this practical constraint, and because other scholars have found en-
rollment to be an acceptable substitute, I will do the same (e.g., Azam and Thelen 2008; 
Brockoff et al. 2015; Testas 2004). Moreover, a country’s enrollment rate is still a use-
ful proxy for educational attainment because it ultimately does tell us something impor-
tant about the country’s level of educational “completion”: e.g., if a country’s tertiary 
enrollment rate is 50%, the necessary implication is that at least the students in that 
50% group completed some form of secondary education.  
 
                                                
 
5 In short, if a terrorist incident met any of the conditions listed below, it was identified as being transnational in na-
ture. If the event met none of these conditions and critical information was not missing (e.g., target type), it was 
coded as a domestic event: (1) The event location differs from the nationality of at least one of the victims; (2) The 
perpetrators targeted either a diplomatic mission (e.g., embassy, consulate) or an international NGO (e.g., Red 
Cross); (3) The perpetrators targeted international organizations (e.g., UN, NATO); (4) The event took place outside 
of the US but involved American casualties or hostages; (5) A hostage crisis or kidnapping occurred and it involved 
more than two countries (e.g., the country of resolution differed from where the incident began). 	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In order to estimate the impact of educational attainment on domestic terrorism, 
I control for the effects of other factors that are also expected to influence the depend-
ent variable. First, I consider the effects of economic variables by including GDP per 
capita (logged)6 and the unemployment rate.7 GDP per capita (GDP p.c.) is an impor-
tant measure of a country’s relative wealth, development, and economic productivity. 
Both GDP p.c. and the unemployment rate may shape a country’s level of domestic ter-
rorism by altering the aggregate economic cost structure of engaging in illegal activity 
(Azam and Thelen 2008; Honaker 2004).  
 
Second, a country’s political system or regime type is also expected to affect 
terrorist production. Terrorist groups are more likely to enjoy a fertile ground for re-
cruitment where governments severely repress civil rights and systematically exclude 
the masses from participating in the political process (Krueger and Laitin 2007; Kur-
rild-Klitgaard et al. 2006). Conversely, incidents of terror are expected to be negatively 
associated with inclusive regimes (e.g., such as democracies) that offer meaningful op-
portunities to express grievances and contribute to the development of public policy 
(e.g., via peaceful protests, lobbying). To account for these effects, I include a variable 
based on a country’s Polity IV score in a given year.8 	  
 
Third, I control for the effects of political instability and conflict using two vari-
ables. They indicate the number of years of domestic and international conflict each 
country experienced over the previous five years, respectively. Domestic conflict is de-
                                                
 
6 GDP per capita is computed in “current US$” to adjust for differences in foreign currency exchange rates across 
countries and also inflation rates across time. For more information, please refer to the World Bank data page 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.PCAP.CD). GDP per capita is logged because its effect on domestic 
terrorism likely diminishes after hitting a certain threshold. Many other scholars incorporate the log of GDP per cap-
ita as controls in their studies (e.g., Freytag et al. 2010; Gassebner and Luechinger 2011; Kis-Katos et al. 2011; 
Krueger and Laitin 2008; Li 2005).	  
 
7 If the correlation between GDP per capita and the unemployment rate were high, that would be problematic. How-
ever, it is not. A correlation matrix of the variables is included in Appendix III. 	  
 
8 I had the option of using a democracy dummy either in the place of, or in addition to, the Polity IV score. However, 
I decided against this for a few reasons. First, for theoretical reasons, I am interested in understanding whether in-
cremental gains in political liberalism affect the generation of domestic terrorism. I prefer this reframing of the issue 
because it acknowledges the fact that there are many political regimes that lie between the two extremes of consoli-
dated democracy and absolute monarchy (or autocracy). Second, it would have been inefficient to include both esti-
mators (i.e., the democracy dummy and Polity IV score) due to their covariance. Moreover, the use of the Polity IV 
Score (i.e., instead of the democratic dummy) is the means of operationalizing political liberalism preferred by many 
scholars who study this subject (e.g., Brockoff et al. 2015; Kis-Katos et al. 2011; Li and Schaub 2004). 	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fined as episodes of violence within a country that involve either domestic groups or 
domestic groups and the state; international conflict denotes periods of violence be-
tween the state and another sovereign state. These data are drawn from the Major Epi-
sodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset managed by the Center for Systemic Peace. 
Political instability or violent conflict can fuel terrorist recruitment by exacerbating ex-
tant intergroup tensions. For instance, Campos and Gassebner (2009) demonstrate that 
civil wars and guerilla warfare increase the number of transnational terror events. Inter-
state wars also have a tendency to generate more terrorist activity (Lai 2007; Piazza 
2008b).  
 
Finally, I consider demographic factors by controlling for the effects of popula-
tion (logged) and urbanization.9 Urbanization is defined as the percentage of the popu-
lation living in urban areas; these variables are also pulled from the World Develop-
ment Indicators dataset of the World Bank. I expect both of these factors to be posi-
tively associated with domestic terrorism, as large populations and urban centers gener-
ate more targets as well as potential recruits, ceteris paribus. These assumptions are 
supported by previous research. Tavares (2004) finds that urbanization is positively as-
sociated with both the number of terrorist attacks and attack-related fatalities; these re-
sults are confirmed by Campos and Gassebner (2009). Scholars also note that popula-
tion size is robustly linked to terrorist production (e.g., Burgoon 2006).  
 
 
 
4.2 Statistical Methodology 
 
 
Standard methods to model discrete count data in the social science literature 
include Poisson and negative binomial regression analyses (Cameron and Trivedi 1986; 
                                                
 
9 According to the large-N terrorism literature, logging the population seems to be the standard means of operational-
izing this variable. As Li and Schaub (2004) explain, “the size of a country…is logged to control for skewed distri-
bution.” Moreover, the relationship between population size and domestic terrorism might be nonlinear in nature: 
i.e., as the population increases (and moves from low demographic heterogeneity to higher demographic heterogene-
ity), increases in terrorism may be non-trivial in scale; however, after hitting a certain threshold, additional increases 
in the population (and heterogeneity) may yield diminished gains in levels of terrorism. The scholars using either a 
common log or a natural log of the population in their large-N terrorism studies include Azam and Thelen (2010), 
Brockoff et al. (2015), Burgoon (2006), Freytag et al. (2010), Gassebner and Luechinger (2011), Kis-Katos et al. 
(2011), Krueger and Laitin (2008), Lai (2007), Li (2005), and Piazza (2011), among many others. Most favor the 
common log, which is what I use in my study.   
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Gardner et al. 1995). However, the Poisson model is more restrictive because it as-
sumes that the conditional mean and variance are equal. Since my dependent variable is 
highly overdispersed (i.e., its variance is substantially larger than its mean), I use the 
negative binomial model.10 Given the possibility of serial correlation and heteroskedas-
ticity associated with the use of pooled datasets, estimations are computed using robust 
standard errors clustered over countries (e.g., see Brockoff et al. 2015; Burgoon 2006). 
Per standard protocol, I also include a set of dummies for year and region to control for 
idiosyncratic effects tied to a particular period or area.11 	  
 
Due to the nature of my study, reverse causality is a possible issue. The volume 
of terrorist incidents may influence future educational attainment, economic perform-
ance, or the quality of political institutions. To reduce the correlation between my pa-
rameters and the error term, all explanatory variables are either lagged by 1 year (t-1) or 
presented over a five-year period. However, as Kis-Katos et al. (2011) point out, these 
controls may be insufficient in countries with a longer history of terrorist activity. In 
such cases, previous incidents of terrorism may have impacted the lagged explanatory 
variables as well; additionally, the collective experiences (e.g., skill, reputation) ac-
crued by established terrorist organizations improve their ability to launch future at-
tacks. As an extra control for endogeneity, I thus include the average annual number of 
total terrorist events over the past five years (i.e., both domestic and transnational). For 
a correlation matrix of the variables I use in my regression analysis, please refer to Ap-
pendix III.  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  
                                                
 
10 The negative binomial model is commonly used in this literature. For example, in their review of 31 cross-national 
terrorism studies published between 1998 and 2010, Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) find that a majority of the studies 
used the negative binomial model. 	  
 
11 Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa.	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CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 displays my six baseline models based on the full sample of countries.12 
In accord with previous cross-national studies, I find that unemployment, domestic con-
flict, and a recent history of terrorist activity emerge as consistent and statistically sig-
nificant predictors of increased domestic terrorism (e.g., Honaker 2004; Kis-Katos et al. 
2011). In particular, the substantive effect of domestic conflict is fairly high. Countries 
that have experienced domestic conflict over the previous five years can expect to ex-
perience about 1.7 more incidents of domestic terrorism per year, ceteris paribus. 
Larger populations are also expected to boost terrorist activity, confirming the findings 
of Burgoon (2006) and others. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
                                                
 
12 In Chapter 5, I report the normal (i.e., unadjusted) coefficients of my regression models. Alternatively, I could 
have chosen to report incident rate ratios (IRR’s), which generally make the substantive results for count models 
easier to interpret. However, I decided against this because my count models are nonlinear—and thus the results are 
actually much more difficult to interpret if IRR’s are reported. Moreover, the vast majority of scholars working in 
the large-N terrorism literature prefer normal coefficients over IRR’s when reporting results for their count models. 
In fact, I reviewed 26 large-N terrorism studies based on count models, and only 2 of them reported IRR’s; the rest 
preferred the use of normal unadjusted coefficients. In any case, although I report normal coefficients in the main 
part of my paper, I provide another version of Table 1 (baseline models) with IRR’s in Appendix IV.	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Table 1 
 
Baseline Models (full sample) 
 
Full Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pri. and Sec. % (PS) 2.0x10-5	  
(.0036) 
.0188	  
(.0101)* 
  -8.2x10-5 
(.0043) 
.0179	  
(.0126) 
PS2  -6.3x10-5 
(3.5x10-5)* 
   -6.1x10-5 
(4.2x10-5) 
Tert. % (Tert)   -.0033 
(.0065) 
.0066	  
(.0167) 
-.0059	  
(.0069) 
.0045	  
(.0166) 
Tert2    -9.7x10-5 
(.0002) 
 -8.4x10-5 
(.0002) 
Polity IV Score .0761	  
(.0320)** 
.0752	  
(.0319)** 
.0677	  
(.0374)* 
.0633	  
(.0374)* 
.0748	  
(.0350)** 
.0675	  
(.0340)** 
GDPpc (logged) .0976	  
(.2138) 
.1611	  
(.2113) 
.1210	  
(.2452) 
.1116	  
(.2447) 
.1718	  
(.2422) 
.2208	  
(.2390) 
Unemployment % .0409	  
(.0132)*** 
.0391	  
(.0133)*** 
.0365	  
(.0136)*** 
.0361	  
(.0135)*** 
.0452	  
(.0133)*** 
.0445	  
(.0134)*** 
Population (logged) 1.3017	  
(.1422)*** 
1.2981	  
(.1439)*** 
1.2782	  
(.1687)*** 
1.2680	  
(.1691)*** 
1.3653	  
(.1719)*** 
1.3474	  
(.1714)*** 
Urbanization % -.0104	  
(.0066) 
-.0088	  
(.0066) 
-.0073	  
(.0068) 
-.0088	  
(.0073) 
-.0086	  
(.0076) 
-.0089	  
(.0076) 
Yrs. Of dom. conf. (past 5) .3347	  
(.0512)*** 
.3369	  
(.0511)*** 
.3415	  
(.0491)*** 
.3416	  
(.0493)*** 
.3373	  
(.0572)*** 
.3375	  
(.0570)*** 
Yrs. Of intl. conf. (past 5) .1540	  
(.0997) 
.1419	  
(.0957) 
.1178	  
(.0938) 
.1203	  
(.0905) 
.1532	  
(.1079) 
.1379	  
(.1046) 
Avg. annual no. of terror 
events (past 5) 
.0175	  
(.0052)*** 
.0176	  
(.0052)*** 
.0174	  
(.0051)*** 
.0174	  
(.0051)*** 
.0169	  
(.0057)*** 
.0172	  
(.0057)*** 
       
No. of countries  145 145  149  149  144  144 
 
Note: Dependant variable is the number of domestic terrorism events per year. Models include a set of 
dummies for region and year; all parameters are lagged by 1 year (t-1) except for the last three control 
variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the .1, .05, 
.01 levels, respectively. 	  
 
 
 
Interestingly, politically liberal regimes also appear to be associated with higher 
rates of domestic terrorism. However, this might be due to a systematic underreporting 
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bias of incidents among autocracies (Drakos and Gofas 2006b) or a nonlinear connec-
tion between political rights and terrorist activity (Abadie 2006).13   
 
This first round of analysis fails to support the predictions of Hypothesis 1 (H1), 
which suggests that gains in the attainment of basic and intermediate education will in-
crease incidents of domestic terrorism, whereas gains in the attainment of higher education 
will reduce incidents of domestic terrorism. According to the actual data, neither primary 
and secondary enrollment nor tertiary enrollment bears a statistically significant link 
with domestic terrorism at all. Moreover, I can reject Hypothesis 2 (H2) for the full 
sample as well, because the square terms are not significant in any of the models that 
included them (i.e., Models 2, 4, 6). 
 
However, these results do not necessarily suggest that educational attainment is 
totally unrelated to the generation of domestic terrorist events in all cases. Instead, the 
relationship between these two variables might actually be quite robust under certain 
conditions (e.g., given a more homogenous set of countries).14 According to Hypotheses 
3a and 3b, the effects of tertiary enrollment on domestic terrorism are conditioned by 
the political and economic conditions of the country, respectively. To test these predic-
tions, I use three separate processes to create six subsets of my sample and re-run the 
full model on each of these smaller and more homogenous groups of countries.  
 
To test Hypothesis 3a, I first find the average Polity IV score of each country 
for the years 1982-2012. Countries with an average of at least 6 are classified as de-
mocracies (subsample #1) while those with an average of -6 and below are identified as 
autocracies (subsample #2), per the Polity IV coding system. To test Hypothesis 3b, I 
return to my full sample and create four additional subsamples based on the average 
                                                
 
13 Using data from Freedom House, Abadie (2006) finds that states with very low political rights and very high po-
litical rights are the most vulnerable to terrorist incidents. As Lai (2007) points out, highly democratic states might 
paradoxically face a greater number of terrorist attacks than less democratic—but not totally autocratic—states be-
cause they are less able to use draconian measures to enforce internal security (e.g., due to stronger normative re-
strictions against the monitoring of citizens and the use of harsh interrogation techniques).	  
 
14 As Elster (1998) observes, aggregate results are often misleading: if statistical analysis on a complete dataset sug-
gests that the relationship between X and Y is either inconsistent or weak, it does not categorically preclude the pos-
sibility of a causal relationship between these variables. For instance, these results might suggest that the causal link 
between X and Y is strong in opposing directions among subsets of the full sample; in such a case, the lack of statis-
tical significance merely manifests the net effect of these two opposing forces/effects.	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GDP per capita of the countries for the same period. Those in the top 25% are included 
in subsample #3 and those in the bottom 25% are included in subsample #4; similarly, 
countries in the top 20% are included in subsample #5 and those in the bottom 20% are 
included in subsample #6.  The results of this second round of regression analyses are 
reported in Table 2 below.  
 
 
Table 2 
 
Models Based on Sample Subsets 
 
Political (Polity IV) Economic (GDP p.c.) Sample Subsets  
Dem. 
(7) 
Auto.	  
(8) 
Top 25% 	  
(9) 
B. 25%	  
(10) 
Top 20% 	  
(11) 
B. 20%	  
(12) 
Pri. And Sec. % (PS) .0717	  
(.0371)* 
-.0572	  
(.0438) 
-.0706	  
(.0870) 
-.0013	  
(.0205) 
.0028	  
(.0846) 
.0171	  
(.0238) 
PS2 -.0002	  
(9.6x10-5)* 
2.5x10-4	  
(1.5x10-4)* 
.0001	  
(.0002) 
9.3x10-6	  
(8.8x10-5) 
-7.1x10-6	  
(.0002) 
-6.7x10-5	  
(9.7x10-5) 
Tert. % (Tert) -.0580	  
(.0222)*** 
-.0020	  
(.0330) 
-.0603	  
(.0304)** 
.0048	  
(.0652) 
-.0743	  
(.0247)*** 
.1878	  
(.2031) 
Tert2 .0004	  
(1.7x10-4)** 
-.0002	  
(.0003) 
3.6x10-4	  
(2.0x10-4)* 
-.0007	  
(.0013) 
4.3x10-4	  
(1.6x10-4)*** 
-.0061	  
(.0077) 
Polity IV Score .1650	  
(.1443) 
-.0027	  
(.1134) 
.1813	  
(.0911)** 
-.0071	  
(.0517) 
.3712	  
(.1283)*** 
.0454	  
(.0579) 
GDPpc (logged) .8190	  
(.3315)** 
-.7930	  
(.6440) 
.6019	  
(.8395) 
-1.2951	  
(.7930) 
-2.0224	  
(1.1566)* 
-1.0137	  
(.7554) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of countries  53 31 36 36 29 28 
 
Note: Dependant variable is the number of domestic terrorism events per year. All models in Table 2 (7-
12) also include other controls from models 1-6 in Table 1: e.g., unemployment, urbanization, popula-
tion, domestic conflict, etc. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *, **, *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at the .1, .05, .01 levels, respectively. 	  
 
 
 
According to the results in Table 2, a country’s level of political rights plays a 
role in shaping the effect of higher educational attainment on domestic terrorism. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 3a, among democratic nations, gains in tertiary education seem 
to exert a pacifying effect on domestic terrorist activity (Model 7). The substantive ef-
fects are not trivial. For example, democratic states with a tertiary enrollment of 70% 
can expect to experience 2.1 fewer incidents per year, ceteris paribus. In contrast, there 
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is little evidence of a similarly consistent and significant pacifying effect of tertiary en-
rollment among autocratic states (Model 8). Together, these findings lend empirical 
support to the theory that the effect of gains in tertiary education on domestic terrorism 
is itself mediated by political conditions within a given country. In countries that pro-
tect civil liberties and provide political rights, higher education promotes more peaceful 
forms of participation in the political process. On the other hand, political repression 
and exclusion seem to either eliminate or at least militate against this link among more 
authoritarian states.  
 
The empirical support for Hypothesis 3b is also quite robust, as indicated by 
Models 9 and 11. As expected, gains in tertiary education reduce domestic terrorism 
among wealthy countries—and the conditioning effect of economic development seems 
to be roughly similar to that of a politically liberal regime. Among countries in the top 
richest quartile by GDP per capita, tertiary enrollment of 70% is expected to generate 
2.5 fewer events of domestic terrorism per year. Among countries in the top fifth, how-
ever, the drop is even greater—about 3.1 fewer events per year. On the other hand, ter-
tiary enrollment is not predicted to decrease incidents of domestic terrorism among 
poor countries; in fact, marginal gains may even promote terrorist events, although 
these effects are not significant at conventional levels (Models 10, 12). 
 
Interestingly, neither economic development nor the provision of political rights 
appears to have a conditioning effect on the link between basic/intermediate educa-
tional attainment and domestic terrorism. According to my theory, as primary and sec-
ondary enrollment increases at the country level, citizens are generally more likely to 
be involved in all forms of political activism. In countries experiencing severe under-
development or political repression, an aggregate rise in political activism is expected 
to promote trends in its more violent forms as well. However, the results of my statisti-
cal analysis fail to support this narrative, showing that enrollment in basic/intermediate 
education is not significantly tied to incidents of domestic terrorism regardless of the 
country’s poor economic or political conditions. Thus, I can reject the second half of 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) for these more homogenous subsets of countries as well. 	  
 
According to the second round of regression analyses, Hypothesis 2 (H2) finds 
some empirical support. Among democratic countries and very wealthy countries (i.e., 
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top 20% in GDP per capita), the effects of tertiary enrollment do appear to yield dimi-
nishing returns (Models 7, 11). For example, democratic states with a tertiary enroll-
ment rate of 30% experience 1.38 fewer incidences of domestic terrorism per year; tho-
se with a tertiary enrollment rate of 40% experience 1.68 fewer events per year. That is, 
as the tertiary enrollment rises from 30% to 40%, democratic countries benefit from a 
net reduction of .3 annual incidences of domestic terrorism. However, a gain in the ter-
tiary enrollment rate of the same magnitude between 60% to 70% only yields a net re-
duction of .06 events per year : i.e., 2.04 fewer events at 60% enrollment versus 2.1 fe-
wer events at 70% enrollment. 	  
 
Qualitatively, Model 7 suggests that the benefits of tertiary enrollment also ge-
nerate increasingly diminishing returns among very wealthy countries as well (i.e., tho-
se in the top 20% by GDP per capita). Among these very wealthy countries, a rise in 
the tertiary enrollment between 30% to 40% generates a net reduction of .44 events per 
year (i.e., 1.84 fewer events at 30% and 2.28 fewer events at 40%); however, a rise in 
the tertiary enrollment of the same magnitude between 60% to 70% generates a net re-
duction of only 0.18 (i.e., 2.91 fewer events at 60% and 3.09 fewer events at 70%). On 
the other hand, among countries that are wealthy but not “very wealthy” (i.e., top 25% 
in GDP per capita), the square term is only statistically significant at the 90% confiden-
ce level. This finding indicates that the link between tertiary enrollment and domestic 
terrorism for this group is probably better modeled by a linear relationship. 	  
 
To recapitulate, the empirical results thus far suggest that the effects of educa-
tional attainment on incidents of domestic terrorism depend on at least two mediating 
factors: (1) the base level of education; (2) the structural conditions of the country. 
First, gains in primary and secondary enrollment do not exert statistically significant 
effects on a country’s level of domestic terrorism. That is, there is little empirical evi-
dence that gains in these lower and intermediate levels of education either increase or 
reduce a country’s risk of domestic terrorism. Second, gains in tertiary enrollment do 
affect incidents of domestic terrorism—but only when the country’s structural condi-
tions are favorable. Moreover, these effects appear to be nonlinear in nature, eventually 
yielding diminished returns among countries that are democratic, very wealthy, or both.  
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In an attempt to extend the findings of Brockoff et al. (2015), I will now test 
whether the pacifying effects of tertiary enrollment require both favorable political 
conditions and favorable economic conditions. In their study, Brockoff et al. (2015) 
found that the directional effects of tertiary enrollment on domestic terrorism are de-
termined by country-specific factors. Brockoff and her coauthors used twelve variables 
in their cluster analysis to assign each country to one of the two groups: (i) favorable 
structural conditions; (ii) unfavorable structural conditions.15  
 
As a result of this research design, the scholars in their subsequent analysis were 
unable to discern precisely why a growth of university enrollment would reduce levels 
of domestic terrorism among countries in the first group. What was the deciding factor? 
That is, were the conditional effects of tertiary enrollment primarily dependent upon a 
country’s level of political rights or degree of economic development and wealth? Al-
ternatively, do the pacifying effects of university enrollment require both types of con-
textual factors to be favorable? 	  
 
In this part of my study, I will seek to test whether gains in tertiary enrollment 
can reduce levels of domestic terrorism in countries that are wealthy or provide politi-
cal rights and freedoms via a democratic system of governance. In short, I want to un-
derstand whether either condition might be sufficient by itself. As predicted by mod-
ernization theory, most of the very wealthy countries in the dataset are also democra-
cies. Table 3 below displays all of the countries that fall into either or both of the follo-
wing two groups based on data between 1982-2012: wealthy (i.e., top 20% by GDP per 
capita) or democratic. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                
 
15 Again, the full list of variables used by Brockoff et al. (2015) to assign countries to either one of the two clusters 
included: law and order, corruption, government size, physical integrity, population density, population growth, 
urbanization, GDP per capita, economic growth, property rights protection, inflation, and female labor participation.  	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Table 3 
 
Wealth and/or Democratic Countries by Group (1982-2012)16 
 
Wealthy and Democ-
ratic (24) 
Only Wealthy (4) Only Democratic (29) 
 
▪ Australia 
▪ Austria 
▪ Belgium 
▪ Canada 
▪ Cyprus 
▪ Denmark 
▪ France 
▪ Germany 
▪ Greece 
▪ Ireland 
▪ Israel 
▪ Italy 
▪ Japan 
▪ Lithuania 
▪ Luxembourg 
▪ Netherlands 
▪ New Zealand 
▪ Norway 
▪ Slovenia 
▪ Spain 
▪ Sweden 
▪ Switzerland 
▪ United Kingdom 
▪ United States 
 
▪ Bahrain 
▪ Kuwait 
▪ Qatar 
▪ UAE 
 
▪ Argentina 
▪ Bolivia 
▪ Colombia 
▪ Costa Rica 
▪ Czech Republic 
▪ Dominican Republic 
▪ Ecuador 
▪ El Salvador 
▪ Estonia 
▪ Finland 
▪ Honduras 
▪ India 
▪ Jamaica 
▪ Latvia 
▪ Macedonia 
▪ Mauritius 
▪ Moldova 
▪ Namibia 
▪ Peru 
▪ Portugal 
▪ Serbia 
▪ South Africa 
▪ Timor-Leste 
▪ Trinidad and Tobago 
▪ Turkey 
▪ Ukraine 
▪ Uruguay 
▪ Venezuela 	  
 
 
 
 
As Table 3 indicates, there is a great deal of overlap between the countries in 
subsample #1 (democracies) and the countries in subsample #5 (top 20%, based on 
GDP per capita). In fact, there are 24 countries that fit both categories: i.e., the coun-
                                                
 
16 Countries were categorized based on average Polity IV scores and GDP per capita over the period 1982-2012. 
Countries are listed in alphabetical order for each column. 	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tries in column one of Table 3 are generally wealthy consolidated democracies. Thus, 
the regression models in Table 2 should not be used to test whether the pacifying ef-
fects of tertiary education require both political and economic conditions to be favora-
ble. To test this claim, I need to devise a means of creating two groups of nations that 
do not overlap with each other.  	  
 	  
In an ideal world, I would create two groups of countries that represent extre-
mes on both the political and economic continuums: i.e., (A) very poor highly democra-
tic countries and (B) very rich dictatorships. Unfortunately, for a large-N quantitative 
study, such a classification system is difficult because the sample size is too small—
especially in the case of Group A (i.e., India). As such, I settled on the following more 
practical classification system: (A) democratic but not wealthy, and (B) non-democratic 
and high/middle income. For the purposes of my study, the groups I have chosen are 
ultimately sufficient because they still identify groups of nations that are not rich and 
democratic at the same time. Moreover, after describing how I create these two groups, 
I show that these groups are substantially different from each other—in terms of both 
economic development and degree of “democraticness.”	  
 
To create Group A (“democratic but not wealthy”), I return to my full sample. 
Countries placed in Group A satisfy two conditions. First, they must on average have 
passed the minimum threshold for being a democracy for the years 1982-2012: that is, 
the 30-year average of their Polity IV scores must meet or exceed 8 on the adjusted Pol-
ity IV scale of 0 to 10.17 Second, they must not be classified as a “high-income country” 
by the World Bank.18 Countries in Group B (“non-democratic and high/middle in-
come”) must meet the following conditions. First, they must on average have been 
categorized as either a “closed anocracy” or “autocracy” between 1982-2012: that is, 
the 30-year average of their Polity IV scores must be at or below 5 on the adjusted Pol-
                                                
 
17 Polity IV scores were rescaled from the original -10 to 10 scale to an adjusted 0 to 10 scale. The purpose of the 
adjustment was to make it easier to interpret the results of the regression analyses. Again, GDP per capita is meas-
ured in “current US$” to control for differences in foreign currency exchange rates and inflation across time. 	  
 
18  The World Bank uses the “Atlas method” to compute the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of each coun-
try. For the 2016 fiscal year, a country with a GNI per capita above $12,736 (US$) is considered to be a part of the 
high-income group. 	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ity IV scale of 0 to 10. Second, they must be classified as either a “upper-middle-
income country” or a “high-income country” by the World Bank.19  
 
Groups A and B contain very different sets of nations. In fact, there is no over-
lap between these two groups (i.e., there is no country that is in both groups). The over-
all average GDP per capita for all countries between 1982-2012 was $7,698, and the 
overall average Polity Score for the same period was 6.2 (i.e., on an adjusted scale be-
tween 0-10). However, the countries in Group A are substantially poorer (average GDP 
per capita: $2,593) but far more democratic (rescaled Polity score: 8.8). Conversely, the 
countries in Group B are significantly more wealthy (average GDP per capita: $12,277) 
but far more politically repressive and autocratic (rescaled Polity score: 1.9). Table 3 
presents a list of the countries in each group.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                
 
19 For the 2016 fiscal year, upper-middle-income countries were those with a GNI per capita between $4,126 to 
$12,735; high-income countries were those with a GNI per capita above $12,736 (US$). 	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Table 4 
 
Countries in Groups A and B 
 
Group A: Democratic but not 
Wealthy (20) 
Group B: Non-Democratic with 
High/Medium Income (13) 
 
▪ Bolivia 
▪ Botswana 
▪ Colombia  
▪ Costa Rica 
▪ Dominican Republic 
▪ Ecuador 
▪ El Salvador 
▪ Honduras 
▪ India 
▪ Jamaica 
▪ Macedonia 
▪ Mauritius 
▪ Moldova 
▪ Namibia 
▪ Peru 
▪ Serbia 
▪ South Africa 
▪ Timor-Leste 
▪ Turkey 
▪ Ukraine	  
 
 
▪ Algeria 
▪ Bahrain 
▪ Cuba 
▪ Gabon 
▪ Iran 
▪ Jordan  
▪ Kazakhstan 
▪ Kuwait 
▪ Libya 
▪ Qatar 
▪ Saudi Arabia 
▪ Tunisia 
▪ UAE  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 below presents the regression analyses on these two final subsets of the 
sample: Group A (Democratic but not Wealthy) and Group B (Non-Democratic with 
High/Medium Income). Further supporting the results of previous analyses, primary 
and secondary levels of enrollment do not seem to be tied to the levels of domestic ter-
rorism in a country. Interestingly, tertiary education does exert a significant pacifying 
effect among the countries in Group A (Democratic but not Wealthy) but not among 
those in Group B (Non-Democratic with High/Medium Income). For instance, the re-
sults of Model 13 suggest that the countries in Group A with a tertiary enrollment rate 
of 70% can expect to experience about 4.5 fewer incidents of domestic terrorism per 
year, ceteris paribus.  
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Moreover, Hypothesis 2 also finds support among the countries in Group A, as 
Model 13 suggests that the pacifying effects of tertiary enrollment begin to diminish at 
higher levels. For instance, countries in Group A with a tertiary enrollment rate of 30% 
experience 3.14 fewer incidences of domestic terrorism per year; those with a tertiary 
enrollment rate of 40% experience 3.78 fewer events per year. That is, as tertiary en-
rollment rises from 30% to 40%, these countries benefit from a net reduction of .64 an-
nual incidences of domestic terrorism. However, a gain in the tertiary enrollment rate of 
the same magnitude between 60% to 70% only yields a net reduction of .04 events per 
year : i.e., 4.48 fewer events at 60% enrollment versus 4.52 fewer events at 70% en-
rollment. 	  
 
Table 5 
 
Models Based on Sample Subsets (A and B) 
 
 
Sample Subsets Group A 
(Model 13) 
Group B 	  
(Model 14) 
Pri. And Sec. % (PS) .0161	  
(.0888) 
-.0114	  
(.2398) 
PS2  2.3x10-5	  
(.0003) 
.0002	  
(.0006)  
Tert. % (Tert) -.1346	  
(.0410)*** 
.3229	  
(.2672) 
Tert2 .0010	  
(.0004)** 
-.0068	  
(.0040)* 
Polity IV Score -.2179	  
(.1761) 
 .0654	  
(.1556) 
GDPpc (logged) -.1557	  
(.9358) 
 5.0196	  
(2.3231)** 
Other controls Yes Yes 
No. of countries  20 13 
 
Note: Dependant variable is the number of domestic terrorism events per year. Both models in Table 5 
(13 and 14) also include other controls from models 1-12 in Tables 1 and 2: e.g., unemployment, urbani-
zation, population, domestic conflict, etc. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *, **, *** denote statis-
tical significance at the .1, .05, .01 levels, respectively. 	  
 
These findings are noteworthy for a few reasons. First, they offer some initial 
empirical evidence that the pacifying effects of tertiary education on domestic terrorism 
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do not necessarily require countries to possess both high levels of economic develop-
ment and high degrees of “democraticness.” Specifically, a democratic form of gover-
nance may provide a sufficiently favorable context, even in the absence of great eco-
nomic wealth. In fact, this finding is particularly surprising because as previously no-
ted, the countries in Group A are substantially poorer than the average country in the 
full sample: i.e., the overall average GDP per capita for all countries between 1982-
2012 was $7,698—compared to a mere $2,593 for the countries in Group A. 	  
 
On the other hand, Model 14 indicates that even in the presence of medium to 
high economic development, the lack of democratic political institutions may eliminate 
the pacifying effects of tertiary enrollment. The countries in Group B are significantly 
more wealthy (i.e., with a 30-year average GDP per capita of $12,277). However, they 
are also significantly more repressive and autocratic—having an average (rescaled) Pol-
ity score of 1.9, compared to the overall average of 6.2, and Group A’s average of 8.8.  
 
Thus, this present study extends the findings of Brockoff et al. (2015), which 
suggested that the effects of advances in education are dependent upon a country’s “so-
cioeconomic, politico-institutional, and demographic conditions.” Due to their research 
design, Brockoff and her coauthors were unable to empirically disentangle the interven-
ing effects of political and economic variables. Thus, it was unclear which specific fac-
tors were driving their finding that tertiary education exerts pacifying effects under “fa-
vorable structural conditions.” According to the results in Table 5, the pacifying effects 
of tertiary enrollment probably do not require a structural context as favorable as the 
one implied by Brockoff et al. (2015). In fact, a majority of the countries in Group A 
(Table 4) had actually been identified by the aforementioned authors as belonging to 
the “Subsample of Less Developed Nations” (i.e., the group with less favorable struc-
tural conditions).  
 
Finally, another contribution of this paper is to help clarify the minimum thres-
hold of “democraticness” countries must meet in order to enjoy the pacifying effects of 
tertiary enrollment. A quick glance at Table 4 indicates that the countries in Group A 
are probably not what most scholars would consider to be consolidated (i.e., mature or 
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“liberal”) democracies.20 However, within the context of this study, the choice to use 
“illiberal” or partial democracies is arguably more empirically valuable. If the regres-
sion analysis had been performed on a hypothetical group of poor consolidated democ-
racies, the results might only be applicable to poor consolidated democracies; instead, 
the actual results (Model 13) suggests that tertiary enrollment can have pacifying ef-
fects even in countries that do not have fully mature democratic institutions and cul-
tures.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
20 To reiterate, I was not able to put together a group of truly poor liberal democracies due to issues of sample size.	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CHAPTER 6:  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
 
 
 
 
I examine the robustness of these findings by checking for endogeneity, using 
an alternative statistical model, using interaction terms, and testing the plausibility of 
the theorized transmission channels. First, I check for endogeneity. The problem of en-
dogeneity might be present, for instance, if an omitted variable “X” exerts a causal ef-
fect on both my key independent variables (IV) and the dependent variable (DV). Thus, 
I perform the two-step Hausman test for endogeneity (e.g., Brockoff et al. 2015). In 
stage one, I estimate a reduced-form equation for each education variable using a set of 
exogenous regressors; afterwards, I store these residuals. In the second stage, I add 
these residuals back into my full baseline model. Like Brockoff and her co-authors 
(2015), I also find that the residuals are not significant, suggesting that the education 
variables are not affected by the endogeneity problem.   
 
Second, I examine whether my results are robust to an alternative statistical 
methodology. As previously indicated, most scholars working with large-N cross-
national terrorism datasets use the negative binomial model; however, a few have also 
used the zero-inflated version of this model as a robustness check (e.g., Piazza 2008b). 
As Drakos and Gofas (2006b) point out, terrorism datasets might suffer from a system-
atic non-reporting bias among autocracies. That is, a “zero outcome” is due to one of 
two distinct processes: a country actually did not experience an incident that year, or it 
went unreported. To account for this possible effect, I run a series of zero-inflated nega-
tive binomial (ZINB) regressions. A Polity IV democracy variable is used in the logit 
part of the model. Like Piazza (2008b) and others scholars, I find that the use of the 
ZINB estimator generates results that are largely similar to that of the normal negative 
binomal model. That is, in this case, the ZINB estimator also suggests that educational 
attainment exerts a nonlinear effect on domestic terrorism—and this effect is mediated 
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by contextual factors. These results generally support the findings discussed in Chapter 
5.   
 
Third, I also test the robustness of my findings regarding the conditional effects 
of tertiary educational attainment by adding interaction terms to a few new models: one 
model incorporates an interaction term for tertiary enrollment and GDP per capita (i.e., 
“tertiary education * GDP per capita”); another model incorporates an interaction term 
for tertiary enrollment and the Polity score (i.e., “tertiary education * Polity4”). Ac-
cording to the results, the interaction term is not statistically significant in either of the 
models. However, these results do not necessarily negate the findings discussed in 
Chapter 5. If the interaction terms had been significant, it would not only have indi-
cated that the effects of tertiary enrollment are shaped by political and economic fac-
tors—but also that the effects of political and economic factors are themselves shaped 
by tertiary enrollment levels.  
 
In other words, empirically, the use of an interaction term implies that the inter-
action effect goes both ways. However, my theory did not suggest that the effects of 
“democraticness” or economic development on domestic terrorism would be mediated 
by tertiary enrollment. Instead, my theory only suggested that the effects of tertiary en-
rollment would be mediated by these political and economic contextual factors. Thus, 
the better empirical strategy for my specific theory was to do what I did in Chapter 5: 
i.e., run regressions on more homogenous subsets of countries (e.g., a group of wealthy 
countries). Perhaps for this reason, Brockoff and her co-authors (2015) also decided not 
to use interaction terms to test their own conditional effects theory; like me, they tested 
their theory by running regressions on smaller more homogenous subsamples of coun-
tries (e.g., also see Blomberg and Hess 2008). To recapitulate, the interaction terms’ 
lack of statistical significance does not necessarily suggest that the effects of tertiary 
enrollment on domestic terrorism are divorced from the political and economic condi-
tions of the country; instead, these results might simply indicate that the interaction ef-
fects do not go both ways.  
 
Finally, I check whether the assumed transmission channels (i.e., economic op-
portunity costs) connecting a rise in tertiary education to reduced terrorist activity actu-
   
  	  
 43 
ally exist. Tertiary enrollment is indeed positively correlated with GDP per capita. This 
link also holds when GDP per capita is adjusted for relative purchasing power. Though 
provisional, these simple tests suggest that the theorized transmission channels are at 
least plausible. Ideally, I would have also liked to check whether the education vari-
ables are indeed associated with various forms of political participation. Unfortunately, 
to the best of my knowledge, a uniform measure of “political participation” does not 
exist at the cross-national level of analysis. This is left as an area for future study.  
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Supporting the findings of Brockoff et al. (2015), my analysis suggests that the 
effects of educational attainment on domestic terrorism are shaped by key political and 
economic factors. In particular, tertiary enrollment seems to have a pacifying effect on 
levels of domestic terrorism in countries where structural conditions are favorable. Sub-
stantively, these effects are not trivial. Among very wealthy states (i.e., those in the top 
20% in GDP per capita), a tertiary enrollment rate of 70% generates about 3.1 fewer 
incidents of domestic terrorism per year, ceteris paribus; among democratic states, an 
equivalent rate of tertiary enrollment generates about 2.1 fewer incidents of domestic 
terrorism per year. Placed within the context of the other findings, the substantive ef-
fects of tertiary enrollment among countries with favorable structural conditions are 
quite significant. For example, countries that have experienced domestic conflict over 
the past five years can expect to experience about 1.7 more incidents of domestic ter-
rorism per year.  
 
In addition, my thesis also extends the findings of Brockoff et al. (2015) in sev-
eral key ways. First, I show that among wealthy democratic countries, the relationship 
between tertiary enrollment and domestic terrorism is better modeled by a quadratic 
specification; that is, at higher levels of tertiary enrollment, additional gains yield in-
creasingly diminishing returns. For instance, among very wealthy states (Model 11), a 
rise in the tertiary enrollment between 30% to 40% generates a net reduction of 0.44 
events per year (i.e., 1.84 fewer events at 30% and 2.28 fewer events at 40%); however, 
a rise in the tertiary enrollment of the same magnitude between 60% to 70% generates a 
net reduction of only 0.18 (i.e., 2.91 fewer events at 60% and 3.09 fewer events at 
70%). 
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Second, I demonstrate that the pacifying effects of educational attainment do 
not require countries to have both high economic development and robust democratic 
institutions. Instead, it appears as though the threshold for such pacifying effects is ac-
tually probably lower than the one implied by Brockoff et al. (2015). My initial results 
suggest that democratic countries can benefit from these effects even if they are not 
wealthy; moreover, these countries do not need to be consolidated democracies with 
mature democratic institutions (Model 13).  
 
Interestingly, although educational attainment can have pacifying effects among 
non-wealthy democracies, there does not seem to be such an effect among middle/high-
income non-democratic states (Model 14). These results suggest that a country’s politi-
cal regime might play a greater role in mediating the impact of tertiary enrollment on 
incidents of domestic terrorism than high economic development. This does not, how-
ever, imply that economic conditions do not matter at all. Indeed, while the democratic 
countries in Group A (Model 13) were not wealthy, none were extremely poor either. 
Thus, a more nuanced interpretation of the findings indicates that the pacifying effects 
of tertiary enrollment still require countries to reach some minimum threshold of eco-
nomic development.   
 
Ultimately, these results indicate that widening public access to higher educa-
tion, while certainly an admirable goal, is by itself far from a full-proof remedy for the 
problem of domestic terrorism. To optimize the pacifying effects of educational attain-
ment, governments should also implement policies aimed at protecting the political 
rights of citizens and generating broad economic growth. In countries with democratic 
institutions and at least moderate levels of economic development, highly educated citi-
zens have incentives and meaningful opportunities to engage peacefully in the political 
process; moreover, the aggregate economic costs of participation in illicit terrorist ac-
tivity are much more compelling—and thus more likely to discourage such behavior, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
Due to some limitations and related data issues, these results should be taken as 
being subject to future validation. For example, given the implications of my theory, it 
would have been ideal to test the hypotheses by using the completion rates of key edu-
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cational milestones; alternatively, the use of net enrollment rates would also have been 
preferable to the use of gross rates, which can exceed 100%. Unfortunately, the World 
Bank does not publish completion data for educational milestones beyond primary 
school; nor does it publish data for net tertiary enrollment. In addition, as is usually the 
case with this kind of research, the presence of missing data was also a challenge. With 
these issues in mind, I certainly invite attempts to further test or extend my findings via 
the use of improved datasets, alternative parameters, and different statistical models.  
 
For instance, areas for future research include investigating other country-level 
factors that may play a role in shaping the impact of educational attainment on various 
forms of political violence. Educational content is one example. In countries where the 
educational curriculum teaches material that antagonizes certain groups based on eth-
nic, religious, or political identities, more time in such a system may actually aggravate 
intergroup tensions—leading to greater participation in domestic acts of terrorism. 
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APPENDICES	  	  	  	  	  
Appendix A: Number of Domestic Terrorist Events by Country (1983-2013) 	  	  	  	  
Country	   Number	   	   Country	   Number	  
Albania 56  Lebanon 704 
Algeria 1960  Lesotho 12 
Angola 346  Liberia 17 
Argentina 378  Libya 250 
Armenia 14  Lithuania 4 
Australia 30  Luxembourg 12 
Austria 31  Macedonia 87 
Azerbaijan 36  Madagascar 19 
Bahrain 94  Malawi 3 
Bangladesh 770  Malaysia 42 
Belarus 7  Mali 65 
Belgium 44  Mauritania 6 
Benin 7  Mauritius 2 
Bhutan 5  Mexico 255 
Bolivia 184  Moldova 7 
Botswana 7  Morocco 11 
Bulgaria 37  Mozambique 166 
Burkina Faso 4  Namibia 75 
Burundi 314  Nepal 745 
Cambodia 174  Netherlands 40 
Cameroon 19  New Zealand 9 
Canada 39  Nicaragua 633 
Central African Repub-
lic 38 
 
Niger 37 
Chad 20  Nigeria 1216 
Chile 1896  Norway 6 
China 150  Pakistan 7529 
Colombia 5448  Panama 84 
Comoros 5  Papua New Guinea 52 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 144  Paraguay 44 
Congo, Rep. 12  Peru 4693 
Costa Rica 10  Philippines 3059 
Cote d'Ivoire 33  Poland 23 
Croatia 17  Portugal 28 
Cuba 24  Qatar 2 
Cyprus 65  Romania 2 
Czech Republic 15  Russian Federation 1627 
Denmark 12  Rwanda 114 
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Dominican Republic 64  Saudi Arabia 34 
Ecuador 135  Senegal 76 
Egypt 673  Serbia 7 
El Salvador 1852  Sierra Leone 50 
Equatorial Guinea 2  Singapore 3 
Eritrea 7  Slovakia 13 
Estonia 7  Slovenia 4 
Ethiopia 44  South Africa 1528 
Fiji 13  South Korea 17 
Finland 4  Spain 1492 
France 1539  Sri Lanka 2059 
Gabon 3  Sudan 135 
Gambia 3  Suriname 38 
Georgia 144  Swaziland 13 
Germany 238  Sweden 30 
Ghana 16  Switzerland 25 
Greece 674  Syria 325 
Guatemala 551  Tajikistan 98 
Guinea 17  Tanzania 14 
Guinea-Bissau 7  Thailand 2103 
Guyana 16  Timor-Leste 6 
Honduras 150  Togo 40 
Hungary 33  Trinidad and Tobago 15 
India 7102  Tunisia 23 
Indonesia 502  Turkey 1760 
Iran 186  Uganda 225 
Ireland 106  Ukraine 43 
Israel 1079  United Arab Emirates 4 
Italy 210  United Kingdom 2143 
Jamaica 9  United States 714 
Japan 253  Uruguay 25 
Jordan 24  Uzbekistan 13 
Kazakhstan 18  Venezuela 143 
Kenya 256  Vietnam 5 
Kuwait 30  Yemen 715 
Kyrgyzstan 16  Zambia 45 
Laos 12  Zimbabwe 48 
Latvia 10     
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD), National Consortium for the Study of Ter-
rorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland 	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Appendix B: Summary Statistics 	  	  	  
Variable	   Mean	   Median	   SD	   Min	   Max	  
Dom. Terror Event 15.16	   0	   63.77	   0	   1742	  
Primary and Sec. Enroll-
ment (Gross %, combined) 
166.82  	   180.13	   43.75	   23.02	   266.55	  
Tertiary Enrollment (Gross 
%) 
26.09	   20.19	   23.54	   .08	   117.89	  
Polity IV Score (0-10) 6.21	   7.5	   3.54	   0	   10	  
GDP per capita (logged) 3.34 3.26	   .72	   1.81	   5.06	  
Unemployment (%) 8.61 7.2	   6.13	   0	   39.3	  
Population (logged) 6.97 6.95	   .67	   5.40	   9.13	  
Urbanization (%) 52.07 52.58	   23.88	   4.67	   100	  
Years of Domestic Conflict 
(past 5) 
.95	   0	   1.81	   0	   5	  
Years of International Con-
flict (past 5) 
.14	   0	   .70	   0	   5	  
Avg. Annual Number of 
Terrorist Events (past 5) 
14.65	   1	   46.76	   0	   823.2	  
 
Sources: Global Terrorism Database (GTD), World Development Indicators (World 
Bank), Polity IV Project (Center for Systemic Peace), Major Episodes of Political Vio-
lence (MEPV) dataset (Center for Systemic Peace)	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Appendix C: Correlation Matrix 	  	  	  
 PS Tert. P. 4 GDP Unemp. Pop. Urban. DC (p5) IC (p5) 
Avg. TE 
(p5) 
           
PS 1.00          
Tert. 0.69 1.00         
P. 4 0.46 0.51 1.00        
GDPpc 0.73 0.75 0.55 1.00       
Unemp. -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 1.00      
Pop. -0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.21 1.00     
Urban. 0.70 0.69 0.41 0.81 -0.02 -0.02 1.00    
Yrs. DC 
(past 5) -0.25 -0.24 -0.16 -0.29 -0.05 0.36 -0.23 1.00   
Yrs. IC (past 
5) -0.08 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.10 -0.06 0.15 1.00  
Avg. #T/E 
(past 5) -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.49 0.01 1.00 
 
Sources: Global Terrorism Database (GTD), World Development Indicators (World 
Bank), Polity IV Project (Center for Systemic Peace), Major Episodes of Political Vio-
lence (MEPV) dataset (Center for Systemic Peace)	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Appendix D: Baseline Models with Incident Rate Ratios (IRR’s) 	  
 
 
Full Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pri. and Sec. % (PS) 1.00002	  
(.0036) 
1.0190	  
(.0103)* 
  .9999 
(.0043) 
1.0181	  
(.0129) 
PS2  .9999 
(3.5x10-5)* 
   .9999 
(4.2x10-5) 
Tert. % (Tert)   .9967  
(.0064) 
1.0066	  
(.0167) 
.9942	  
(.0069) 
1.0045	  
(.0167) 
Tert2    .9999 
(.0002) 
 .9999 
(.0002) 
Polity IV Score 1.0791	  
(.0345)** 
1.0781	  
(.0343)** 
1.0700	  
(.0400)* 
1.0653	  
(.0399)* 
1.0777	  
(.0377)** 
1.0699	  
(.0364)** 
GDPpc (logged) 1.1025	  
(.2357) 
1.1748	  
(.2482) 
1.1286	  
(.2767) 
1.1180	  
(.2736) 
1.1874	  
(.2875) 
1.2471	  
(.2980) 
Unemployment % 1.0417	  
(.0137)*** 
1.0400	  
(.0138)*** 
1.0372	  
(.0141)*** 
1.0368	  
(.0140)*** 
1.0463	  
(.0139)*** 
1.0455	  
(.0140)*** 
Population (logged) 3.6754	  
(.5228)*** 
 3.6623	  
(.5271)*** 
3.5902	  
(.6056)*** 
3.5536	  
(.6009)*** 
3.9169	  
(.6733)*** 
3.8473	  
(.6594)*** 
Urbanization % .9896	  
(.0065) 
.9912	  
(.0066) 
.9928	  
(.0068) 
.9912	  
(.0072) 
.9914	  
(.0075) 
.9911	  
(.0075) 
Yrs. Of dom. conf. (past 5) 1.3975	  
(.0715)*** 
1.4006	  
(.0716)*** 
1.4071	  
(.0691)*** 
1.4072	  
(.0693)*** 
1.4011	  
(.0802)*** 
1.4014	  
(.0798)*** 
Yrs. Of intl. conf. (past 5) 1.1665	  
(.1163) 
1.1525	  
(.1102) 
1.1251	  
(.1056) 
1.1278	  
(.1020) 
1.1656	  
(.1257) 
1.1479	  
(.1200) 
Avg. annual no. of terror 
events (past 5) 
1.0176	  
(.0053)*** 
1.0178	  
(.0053)*** 
1.0175	  
(.0052)*** 
1.0176	  
(.0052)*** 
1.0171	  
(.0058)*** 
1.017	  
(.0058)*** 
       
No. of countries  145 145  149  149  144  144 
 
Note: Dependant variable is the number of domestic terrorism events per year. Models include a set of 
dummies for region and year; all parameters are lagged by 1 year (t-1) except for the last three control 
variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the .1, .05, 
.01 levels, respectively. 	  
 
 
